DNA Testing for Eddy Curry? Creating a New Constitutional Protection by Krishna, Dean
DNA TESTING FOR EDDY CURRY? CREATING A NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
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Think about what's at stake here .... As far as DNA testing, we're just
at the beginning of that universe. Pretty soon, though, we'll know
whether someone is predisposed to cancer, alcoholism, obesity, baldness
and who knows what else.
Hand that information to an employer.., and imagine the implica-
tions. If the NBA were to get away with it, what about everyone else in
this country looking for ajob[?]
-Alan Milstein, attorney for NBA player Eddy Curry'
In late March 2005, Chicago Bulls star Eddy Curry experienced an
irregular heartbeat as he was preparing for a game against the Char-
lotte Bobcats.2 Curry did not play that night, and he went on to miss
the rest of the season.3 Testing revealed that he had benign arrhyth-
mia of the heart.
4
The end of that season also marked the end of Curry's contract
with the Bulls,5 and, as the 2005-2006 season approached, the Bulls'
management decided that it did not want to re-sign the team's
twenty-two-year-old 6 star without first ascertaining if the irregular
heartbeat had been a signal that Curry had a more serious ailment: a
potentially fatal heart condition called hypertrophic cardiomyopa-
thy.7 The Bulls, therefore, offered Curry a long-term contract with
" J.D., 2007, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2001, Dartmouth College. Many
thanks to my teachers, who will always inspire me.
Quoted in Bulls, Curry, Lawyers Tussle over DNA Testing, USA TODAY (McLean, Va.), Sept.
29, 2005, at 12C.
2 David Aldridge, The Heart of the Matter: Curry Was Right to Refuse, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 9,
2005, at D17.
3 Christine Brennan, Curry's Case Foreshadows DNA-Tests-in-Sports Fight, USA TODAY (McLean,
Va.), Oct. 13, 2005, at 7C.
4 Michael Morrissey, Curry Is Ready for Return to Chicago, N.Y. POST,Jan. 18, 2006, at 66.
5 Id.
6 Frank Isola, Eddy Ready to Go: Cuny Passes Physical, Joins Knicks, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Oct. 8,
2005, at 74.
7 Tell-Tale Heart: Is Eddy Curry at Risk for Heart Disease?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 10, 2005,
at 21. It was that condition that led to the tragic on-court deaths of the Boston Celtics' Reggie
Lewis in 1993 and Loyola Marymount college star Hank Gathers in 1990. Id.
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one condition: that he submit to DNA testing to gauge his genetic
susceptibility to hypertrophic cardiomyopathy.8
Curry refused to take the test, arguing that consenting to it would
violate his privacy. 9 Within weeks, the Bulls defused the situation:
they traded away Curry to the New York Knicks, a team that did not
require Curry to submit to DNA testing.' ° An SI.com journalist wrote
at the time that, because of Curry's questionable health, "[a] black
cloud is hanging over Madison Square Garden" for the season.1"
In the 2005-2006 season, Curry played well for the Knicks, averag-
ing over thirteen points a game and starting in sixty-nine of the
Knicks' eighty-two games. 12  During the 2006-2007 season, Curry
played even better. He consistently scored more than twenty points a
game and emerged as the team's leader.1 3 More importantly, he has
not had any heart problems since the trade: "'I haven't had any re-
percussions from it,' Cul said. 'I haven't felt anything, not from the
medication or anything. ,
Despite Curry's health so far, the "black cloud" still hangs over
both Curry and the entire world of employer-employee relations:
What limits (if any) should be placed on DNA testing by employers?
What rights do individuals have in protecting their genetic informa-
tion? The rancor the Curry issue has caused in the sporting world
and the press shows how important the DNA privacy issue is to
Americans. Indeed, the public is right to take the issue seriously;
tremendous liberties are at stake. Should employers be allowed to act
like the Bulls; must they act like the Knicks; or should they take a dif-
ferent approach altogether? Moreover, where should the line be
drawn in a context outside of an employment relationship?
8 Id. The Bulls' management was aware that its offer would prove controversial, but Gen-
eral Manager John Paxson said he had Curry's well-being in mind. To show his goodwill, he
offered Curry $400,000 a year for the next fifty years if he failed the genetic test. Andrew
Seligman, Bulls Send Curry to Knicks, USATODAY.COM, Oct. 3, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/
sports/basketball/nba/2005-10-03-curryx.htm.
9 Id. At the time, several prominent cardiologists had cleared Curry to play, but the Bulls
stuck by the differing opinion of Barry Maron, a world-renowned expert in hypertrophic car-
diomyopathy, who had suggested the DNA test. Id.
10 Isola, supra note 6. The Knicks' doctors cleared Curry to play, and after Curry passed the
Knicks' doctors' tests, team president Isiah Thomas proclaimed, "I'm extremely confident in
what we have and what we've done. Our Eddy's going to be playing in the NBA and living a
healthy life for a long time." Id.
NBA Preview: Future World, SICOM, Nov. 1, 2005, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2005/
basketball/nba/specials/preview/2005/10/31/experts.picks/2html.
12 Eddy Curry: New York Knicks Player Card, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/
players/profile?statsId=35 14. Curry would have started more games were it not for a leg injury.
Stan McNeal, Moving Parts, SPORTING NEWS, Jan. 27, 2006, at 24.
13 Howard Beck, As Planned, Cuny Becomes No. 1 Option, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2006, at D5.
14 John Jackson, Curry's Return One He'd Like to Forget: Former Bull Booed by United Center Fans,
Injured and Fouls Out, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 19, 2006, at 117.
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This Comment will argue that Curry's DNA information should be
afforded heightened protection under both the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. For these
purposes, the state-actor problem of the Bulls will be ignored; the
Bulls will be assumed to be a state actor that is trying to gain access to
Curry's genetic information. The purpose of the Comment is to use
the Curry situation to highlight a more important question: should
an individual's genetic information be constitutionally protected
from government interference?
In order to show the need for constitutional protection, Part I will
begin by examining the flaws with the current system of genetic test-
ing. The current system is not embodied in a comprehensive policy,
law, or ruling, but is rather a mish-mash of federal, state, and private
action that provides spotty protections. Part II will then provide a
context for finding fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and explain how protecting DNA in-
formation fits well within the existing judicial paradigm for funda-
mental rights. Part III will align protection of DNA information with
existing equal protection law, explaining how Curry's situation fits
each step of the analysis. Finally, Part IV will propose a potential
statutory solution for the problem of unprotected DNA information
in lieu of a court-imposed constitutional protection.
I. FLAWS WITH THE CURRENT GENETIC PROTECTION POLICY
Today's scientific advances have allowed researchers to identify spe-
cific genes linked to such diseases as breast cancer, Huntington's Disease,
glaucoma and colon cancer. Researchers hope to be able to identify
genes related to asthma, diabetes, heart disease, and other cancers within
three years, and to make genome testing routine within 20 years.
-E. David Krulewicz
15
As genetic testing becomes more commonplace, one danger is
that employers will use testing results to discriminate against employ-
ees because of anticipated future expenses in insurance costs and de-
creased productivity due to illness. 16 Scholars and policy makers have
discussed this issue for some time. Writing last year in the Journal of
the American Medical Association, the director and deputy director of
the National Human Genome Research Institute called for more
governmental protections for genetics, arguing that "potential dis-
crimination in health insurance or employment based on the results
of genetic testing[ I] has been apparent for several years and requires a
15 E. David Krulewicz, Wearing Your Genes to Work: Use of Genetic Information in Hiring, NJ.
LAW., Mar. 20, 2006, at A3.
16 Id.
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national legislative solution." 7 Unfortunately, there is still no federal
statutory scheme that provides a solution to the problem, and there
are also no significant judicially-imposed protections.18 The current
state of genetic protection is a weak and ununified one, and it is un-
prepared to handle the onslaught of DNA testing that is soon to
come.
A. Statutory Protections
1. Americans with Disabilities Act
There is no cohesive body of law on the privacy of an individual's
genetic information. Various federal and state statutes touch on the
topic, as do some judicial decisions. From a statutory perspective, the
Americans with Disabilities Act' 9 crystallizes the ambiguities behind
federal law. The ADA prohibits discrimination against a "qualified
individual with a disability,"2° but the ADA definition of "disability" is
subject to interpretation. As Marisa Anne Pagnattaro has pointed
out, "a person with a genetic propensity for Parkinson's disease would
not be 'disabled' under the Act merely by virtue of general informa-
tion about how this condition usually affects individuals"; rather, the
individual's specific situation would need to be examined . Instead
of giving the type of positive protection from DNA information that
Eddy Curry sought, the Act protects discrimination against those who
have already been proven to have a disability. Moreover, the Act only
applies to employers with fifteen or more employees. 2
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has
tried to mold the terms of the ADA to hold employers to a stricter
standard with genetic information. Since adopting guidelines against
17 Alan E. Guttmacher & Francis S. Collins, Realizing the Promise of Genomics in Biomedical Re-
search, 294JAMA 1399, 1401 (2005).
18 IBM has taken the lead in providing protections for its own workers, see infra note 83 and
accompanying text, but occasional employer-provided protection is not the solution.
19 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2000).
20 Id. §§ 12111(8), 12112(b)(5)(B).
21 Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee's Right to Privacy
v. Employer's Need to Know, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 139, 160 (2001); see Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527
U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (ruling that courts must investigate a person's actual condition to deter-
mine if the person's genetic information falls within the meaning of "disability" under the
ADA); Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 655 (1998) (placing HIV infection within the meaning
of "disability"). Due to these interpretations of the ADA, "[t]he need for additional [action] to
make explicit the prohibition against discrimination based upon genetic predisposition may be
more imperative following the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decisions interpreting the ADA."
Paul Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 3J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 225, 242 (2000).
22 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
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genetic discrimination in 1995,22 the EEOC has taken the position
that an employer who fails to hire someone based on genetic traits-
as the Bulls threatened to do with Curry-violates the ADA because
the employer would be failing to hire someone the employer views as
disabled.24 This rule was first tested in a 2000 case against Burlington
Northern Santa Fe Railway. 5 The company had been using genetic
testing on workers who submitted claims of work-related carpal-
tunnel injury; the genetic testing determined workers' predisposition
to the injury.2 ' The Railway decided on its own to discontinue its test-
ing program,27 and "[w]hether the courts will adopt the EEOC's posi-
tion ... remains to be seen as there have been no cases deciding the
issue.
2. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
Another important federal law that regulates genetic discrimina-
tion is the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) .29 The law specifically states that "a health insurance issuer
offering group health insurance coverage in connection with a group
health plan[] may not establish rules for eligibility" based on
"[g] enetic information. 30 In the United States, most individuals with
private health insurance obtain their coverage through employment-
based group health insurance.3 ' Therefore, due to HIPAA, the only
concerns about genetic discrimination in health insurance involve
individual policies and nonemployer group plans to which HIPAA
does not apply.3 2 Importantly, HIPAA is limited to health-insurance
decisions and would not apply to employment situations such as the
23 2 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, § 902.8, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html.
See id. (amending definition of "handicapped individual" to include individuals who are
discriminated against beause of their genetic information); see also Victor Schachter, Privacy in
the Workplace, in [1] 6TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW: DATA PROTECTION-THE
CONVERGENCE OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY 153, 192 (2005) (discussing the application of the
EEOC's guidelines to employment refusal).
25 EEOC v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. 02-C-0456, 2002 WL 32155386 (E.D. Wis.
May 8, 2002); see Schachter, supra note 24, at 192-93.
26 Burlington N., 2002 WL 32155386, at *1, cf EEOC v. Woodbridge Corp., 124 F. Supp. 2d
1132, 1139 (W.D. Mo. 2000) (alleging genetic discrimination in employment based partly on
genetic predisposition to carpal-tunnel injury); Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., No. CV 86-0-
753, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19654 (D. Neb. Aug. 19, 1992) (mem.) (challenging a company pol-
icy that violated the rights of those with genetic skin disorders), rev'd, 7 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1993).
27 Schachter, supra note 24, at 193.
28 Id.
29 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2000).
30 Id. § 1182(a)(1)(F).
31 Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Exceptionalism and Legislative Pragmatism, HASTINGS CENTER REP.
July-Aug. 2005, at 27, 32.
32 Id.
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
one Curry faced. A bill passed by the 109th Senate would expand
HIPAA's protections over genetic information,33 but these protections
would still be limited to the health-insurance sphere.
3. Executive Order 13145
The federal law most directly applicable to Curry's situation is Ex-
ecutive Order 13145, signed by President Clinton on February 8,
2000.3' The order prohibits genetic discrimination in federal em-
ployment,36 and it specifically protects "information about an individ-
ual's genetic tests." When explaining his actions, Clinton explained
the rationale for encouraging genetic testing: "The fear of misuse of
private genetic information is already very widespread in our Nation.
Americans are genuinely worried that their genetic information will
not be kept secret .... As a result, they're often reluctant to take ad-
vantage of new breakthroughs in genetic testing ....
While this Order would cover Curry if he were employed by the
Bulls (state-actor problem aside), it still has several shortcomings.
First, not all information about an individual's health is protected; to
obtain protection it must fall within specifically defined categories
outlined by the Executive Order.39 This could potentially leave open
for government examination information about an employee's physi-
cal exams and chemical, blood, or urine analyses.40 Additionally, the
Executive Order "does not create any legally enforceable right," and
much of what it prohibits is also prohibited by section 502 of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973.42 If an employee wants to seek redress for
genetic discrimination, there is a long process involving "multiple
steps of administrative review and investigation. "4 Indeed, in an em-
ployment context, "the existing protection.., falls short of the com-
prehensive law needed to protect the rights of workers and to clarify
33 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2005, S. 306, 109th Cong. (as passed by
Senate, Feb. 10, 2005); see also H.R. 1227, 109th Cong. (as introduced in House, Mar. 10, 2005)
(addressing the same issues as the Senate legislation).
Five Bills to Watch in 2006, in Matthew DoBias, Climbing the Hill. MOD. HEALTH CARE, Jan. 9,
2006, at 24, 25.
35 Exec. Order No. 13,145, 3 C.F.R. 235 (2000), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (2000).
36 Id. § 1-101.
37 Id. § 1-201(e)(1)(A).
38 Remarks on Signing an Executive Order to Prohibit Discrimination in Federal Employment Based on
Genetic Information, 1 PUB. PAPERS 198, 199 (Feb. 8, 2000).
39 Exec. Order No. 13,145, § 1-201 (e) (2), 3 C.F.R. at 236.
4 Id.
41 Pagnattaro, supra note 21, at 157.
42 Id.; Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 792 (2000), as amended by Assistive Technology
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-364, § 3(b) (3), 118 Stat. 1707, 1737.
43 Pagnattaro, supra note 21, at 158.
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the appropriate use of genetic information for employers."04 Even if
the order were strengthened, it simply does not cover most American
citizens; the law covers only 2.7 million federal employees. 5
4. State Protections
While some protections from genetic discrimination are offered
by federal law, existing legislation does not offer comprehensive,
fundamental protections over an individual's right to keep genetic
information private. In the absence of a federal genetic-testing pol-
icy, individual states have taken their own initiatives to protect genetic
information.
The beginning of the Human Genome Project in 1990 served as a
46particular impetus that spurred many states to action. Since 1990,
"nearly every state has enacted legislation prohibiting genetic dis-
crimination in health insurance; two-thirds of the states have enacted
laws prohibiting genetic discrimination in employment, and other
state laws have been enacted dealing with genetic discrimination in
life insurance, genetic privacy, and genetic testing.
4 7
While states have taken the lead in this field, the levels of protec-• 41
tion they offer vary by state. 4 Previously, many state laws only applied
to specific genetic disorders. 9 For example, New York's civil rights
law proscribed employment discrimination only against carriers of
50the sickle-cell trait, Tay-Sachs disease, or Cooley's anemia. In August
2005, however, New York passed a law barring discrimination against
the much broader class of anyone with "predisposing genetic charac-
teristics."' 1 New York's change reflects the general trend, in which
states prohibit discrimination based on the general use of genetic in-
formation rather than on a specifically listed genetic disease. For ex-
ample, in New Mexico, a 2005 law made it unlawful to use not only
DNA genetic information but also family history in employment deci-
sions. Similarly, Massachusetts requires informed consent for an
employee to hand over genetic information,53 and Texas makes it
44 Id. at 156.
45 Susanne B. Haga & Huntington F. Willard, Op-Ed., Act Now to Prevent Genetic Discrimina-
tion, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2005, at A21.
46 Rothstein, supra note 31, at 27.
47 Id. Currently, thirty-six states have genetic information privacy laws. Reginald C. Govan,
Workplace Privacy, in [1] 34TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 273, 395 (2005).
48 Haga & Willard, supra note 45, at A21.
49 Schachter, supra note 24, at 193 & n.106.
5o N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 48 (McKinney 1992).
51 N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 296(1) (McKinney 2005).
5' H.R. 183, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2005).
" MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, §§ 1, 4 (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2000).
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unlawful for an employer to "fail[] or refuse[] to hire" based on ge-
netic information.54
Currently, the status of genetic information is not settled at the
statutory level. While states have begun to grant broader protections
over genetic information in employment situations, there has yet to
be a unified federal policy on the matter. In fact, recent federal legis-
lation to protect against genetic discrimination has been bogged
down,55 partly because employer groups are concerned new legisla-
tion will result in many actions against employers. 6 Acting on this
scattered and sparse statutory guidance, several judicial opinions have
tried to both interpret and control the limits of government access to
an individual's genetic information. As with the legislature, however,
no clear doctrine has emerged from the courts.
B. Judicial Protections
The prominent state-actor cases concerning mandatory genetic
testing, similar to the kind Curry faced, involve a prison or military
context. In these cases, there were particularly strong state justifica-
tions for warranting access to an individual's genetic determination.
The facts around Mayfield v. Dalton show strong parallels to the Curry
situation. In Mayfield, government employees refused to give DNA
samples at their employers' request; specifically, servicemen in the
armed forces resisted an effort by the government to collect their
DNA samples as part of a general armed forces DNA "repository. '"5 s
The servicemen tried using the "search and seizure" feature of the
Fourth Amendment as a shield against genetic information collec-
tion.5 9
The district court in Mayfield ruled that taking specimens from
service members was not an unreasonable seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.6 The court applied a balancing test, finding
54 TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.402 (LexisNexis 2006). Other states have also enacted laws that
ban genetic testing in employment situations. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926 (West 2005) (de-
fining "genetic characteristics"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1202 (West 2001) (preventing
employers from predicating employment on genetic testing); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:3
(LexisNexis 2006 repl.) (forbidding employers from requiring or soliciting genetic tests before
employment); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-5 to :5-47 (West 2002 & Supp. 2006) (banning employ-
ment discrimination based on genetic testing); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292 (McKinney 2005) (prohib-
iting discrimination based on genetics in hiring); and R.I. GEN. LAWs § 28-6.7-1 (2003) (forbid-
ding the use of genetic tests in employment).
Schachter, supra note 24, at 193.
Haga & Willard, supra note 45, at A21.
17 109 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1424.
Id.
60 Mayfield v. Dalton, 901 F. Supp. 300, 304 (D. Haw. 1995), vacated, 109 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir.
1997).
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that the purpose of the collection-to assist in the identification of
soldiers' remains-outweighed any yet unproven, nefarious uses by
the government. 61 The Ninth Circuit, however, ultimately avoided
endorsing any conclusory tests that weighed an individual's Fourth
Amendment right to protection of genetic information; instead, it
concluded that the appealing servicemen lacked standing since they
had already been honorably discharged without ever having given any
body samples for DNA analysis. 2 As a result, Mayfield ultimately pro-
vides "no support for a privacy basis for medical decision-making."63
Eight years later, in United States v. Kincade, the Ninth Circuit ap-
plied a balancing test when it again considered the protection of
DNA information under the Fourth Amendment.64 Specifically, the
court considered the constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment
of a federal law65 that required convicted individuals to give bodily
samples for DNA tests.66 A recently released prisoner, Kincade, re-
fused to give a sample, but the court determined that governmental
interests in collecting information from convicted offenders out-
weighed any intrusion of Kincade's privacy rights.67
The Supreme Court has provided guidelines on forced testing of
employees in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It has recog-
nized that requiring employees to submit to giving blood or body flu-
ids implicates an individual's rights under the Fourth Amendment.
6
In Chandler v. Miller, the Court invalidated drug testing of all candi-
dates for state offices because there was no substantial public interest
69in such a broad program.
Therefore, while the Supreme Court gives some value to individu-
als' right to privacy over their body, and while both Mayfield and Kin-
cade have specific language about the importance of an individual's
DNA protection, no decisions give the right to a constitutional pro-
61 Id. at 304-06. Specifically, the court balanced the minimal intrusion of the sampling
against the military's interest in accounting for soldiers on the field and the peace of mind of
the next of kin.
62 Mayfield, 109 F.3d at 1427.
63 BarbaraJ. Zanotti & Rick A. Becker, Marching to the Beat of a Different Drummer: Is Military
Law and Mental Health Out-of-Step afterJaffee v. Redmond ?, 41 A.F. L. REv. 1, 59 (1997).
" 379 F.3d 813, 839 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit also gave weight to genetic privacy
rights in its 1998 decision in Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, when it allowed a
claim of privacy over genetic information to survive summary judgment. 135 F.3d 1260, 1269,
1275 (9th Cir. 1998).
65 DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat. 2726.
6 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 821.
67 Id. at 84 0.
6' See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (vacating
a judgment that required drug testing of federal employees who did not carry firearms or deal
with drug interdiction); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989)
(finding a diminished expectation of privacy for railroad employees).
69 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997).
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tection of DNA information under the Fourteenth Amendment.7 ° In-
stead, courts apply a balancing test, and Kincade exhibited the mini-
mal weight given to an individual's privacy in a DNA testing situation,
which the court deemed "not significant."" If constitutional weight
had been given to the individual's right (by making it a fundamental
right, and not just a factor to be considered in a Fourth Amendment
analysis), perhaps the outcomes would have been different.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed privacy rights
with respect to genetic discrimination,7 2 the Court has considered a
case in the sporting world on privacy rights regarding drug testing.
In Board of Education v. Earls, the Court ruled that randomly forcing
high school athletes to submit to urine-based drug testing did not vio-
late their Fourth Amendment rights.73 Like the Ninth Circuit, the
Court did not consider Fourteenth Amendment fundamental rights
and did not give constitutional weight to the right to privacy in itself.
7 4
More importantly, while the Earls issue also involves the privacy right
against bodily invasion, DNA rights, like the kind Curry sought,
should be viewed differently because they do not implicate illegal ac-
tivity.
Finally, courts have yet to expand or clearly outline the scope of
75
genetic protections. In Robinson v. City of Seattle, a Washington ap-
pellate court gave the right to DNA information the same weight as a
fundamental constitutional right: the court held a genetic testing
program subject to strict scrutiny. Part of the rationale for the find-
ing, however, was rooted in state constitutional protections. 77 Ulti-
mately, despite such occasional victories for individual privacy, there
remain no clear, judicially-imposed constitutional protections for
DNA information.
70 See generally Kincade, 379 F.3d at 840 (upholding a law requiring certain federal offenders
who were on probation, parole or supervised release to submit to compulsory DNA profiling);
Mayfield v. Dalton, 109 F.3d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1997) (refusing to consider service members'
challenge to a rule requiring them to provide DNA samples on account of their lack of stand-
ing).
7 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 836 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625).
72 Miller, supra note 21, at 252.
73 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002); cf Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665 (allowing drug testing for federal
employees).
71 See generally Earls, 536 U.S. at 825 (holding that a school policy requiring athletes to submit
to urine-based drug testing does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because it is a reason-
able means of furthering the school district's important interest in preventing drug use among
students).
75 See discussion supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the EEOC's attempts to have the courts inter-
pret the ADA in a particular manner).
76 10 P.3d 452, 468-70 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (finding pre-employment drug testing for jobs
with public safety implications "narrowly tailored to achieve compelling governmental inter-
ests").
77 Id. at 460.
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C. Private Protections
Despite the absence of federal protections, there is a relatively
low, yet significant, incidence of genetic testing occurring among pri-
vate companies. The number of Fortune 500 companies engaging in
genetic testing has declined since the mid-nineties, when at least
twenty used such testing.8 The trend now, however, is that genetic
testing will only increase; according to Sharon Terry, president of the
Genetic Alliance, "[i]t is a problem already, and the prospect is that
the problem will only grow. 79
Two main factors will contribute to greater testing, both dealing
with companies' interest in securing the most productive employees
possible. First, technological advances are allowing for screening of a
wider variety of diseases at a cheaper price.80 Second, rises in health
care costs are providing employers with an increasingly strong inter-
est in having healthy workers."'
In 2000, a poll by the National Center for Genome Resources
found that "63 percent of workers would not take genetic tests if em-
ployers could get access to the results. 82 While this employee anxiety
only highlights the need for governmental protections, IBM recently
took leadership in this field into its own hands when it "pledge [d] to
not use genetic information in its hiring practices or in deciding eli-
gibility for health insurance coverage for its 300,000 employees."8"
While IBM's pledge would provide Curry the protection he needed
with the Bulls, trending towards privately given protections is not the
best way to ensure individual protections. Since genetic privacy is not
something employees are likely to consider when weighing an offer
with a higher-paying firm, it is not even guaranteed that employees
will reward employers who offer it, thus giving little incentive for
other companies to join IBM. Even if companies were to join, that
trend may take decades to spread to most employers. If individual
protection of genetic information is something that is to be valued,
78 Schachter, supra note 24, at 192; accord AM. MGMT ASS'N, 2000 AMA SURVEY ON
WORKPLACE TESTING: MEDICAL TESTING 3 (stating that while only seven companies responding
to the survey admitted to genetic testing, follow-up interviews suggested that some companies
may have been conducting testing they did not consider to fall precisely within the survey's
definition of "genetic testing').
Steve Lohr, I.B.M. to Put Genetic Data of Workers Off Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, at Cl.
Nathalie Smith, Note, The Right to Genetic Privacy? Are We Unlocking the Secrets of the Human
Genome Only to Risk Insurance and Employment Discrimination , 2000 UTAH L. REV. 705, 735-36.
8 Id. at 736. In fact, one factor of the Bulls' treatment of Curry may have been their insur-
ance carrier's refusal to continue insuring Curry's heart. LacyJ. Banks, Decision Befuddles Cury,
CHI. SUN-TIMES,July 20, 2005, at 150.
82 Lohr, supra note 78.
83 Haga & Willard, supra note 45; accord Lohr, supra note 78.
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then that protection can only be achieved through governmental pro-
tection.
II. DUE PROCESS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ....
-Due Process Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution
8 4
In its due process jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has given
substantive meaning to the word "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, finding that "some liberties are so important that they are
deemed to be 'fundamental rights."'' 5  In order to establish a due
process right, therefore, Curry needs to establish that protection of
DNA information is a fundamental liberty interest.
Once a right is established as fundamental, courts use strict scru-
tiny to examine laws concerning it, which means that the government
cannot infringe upon the right unless "the government... justif[ies]
its interference by proving the action is necessary to achieve a com-
pelling government purpose.""
A. Overview of Fundamental Rights
Over the 138 years since the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,
the Court has found various rights to be fundamental.87 Originally,
the Court viewed only economic rights as fundamental,88 but starting
in the 1920s, it began expanding the notion of fundamental rights to
include personal rights.88 In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court recognized
the right to raise children as a fundamental right. 0 Two years later,
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court invalidated a state law requiring
attendance at public schools because of the parents' liberty interest in
controlling their children's education. 91 These two cases opened the
door for other findings of fundamental rights based on personal or
family privacy.
84 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
85 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 762 (2d ed. 2002).
86 Id.
87 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (finding a fundamental right to marry);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (finding a fundamental right to teach one's chil-
dren a language other than English).
88 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) ("The general right to make a con-
tract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment.... ."), overruled hyW. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
89 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 84, at 590.
90 262 U.S. at 403.
91 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
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In 1942, the Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson found a
fundamental right in reproduction when it overturned a state statute
that sterilized individuals based on alleged genetic defects. 2 In 1965,
the Griswold Court found a fundamental right of privacy in the right
to access contraceptives in order to control family size.9 Eight years
later, the Roe v. Wade Court found that the right to privacy over re-
production decisions extended to a woman's body in decisions re-
garding whether or not to have an abortion.9 4 While these cases do
not provide an exhaustive list of the fundamental rights established
by the Court, they do show the thematic importance of the right to
bodily privacy in the Court's decision to classify a right as fundamen-
tal.
B. Whalen, Curry, and the Right to Privacy of Medical Information
The Court's 1977 decision in Whalen v. Roe is the closest the Court
has come to deciding an issue such as that presented by Curry, and it
also provides the strongest indication that Curry's DNA information
should be viewed under a fundamental-right rubric.95 Thus far,
Whalen is the only time the Court has ruled on the fundamental pri-
vacy rights implicated when an individual's medical information is
obtained by the state.
Whalen concerned a New York statute that required a centralized
database of all the names and addresses of persons who obtained cer-
tain prescription drugs.96 Significantly, the Court proclaimed that
constitutional privacy
in fact involve [s] at least two different kinds of interests. One is the indi-
vidual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions....
We are persuaded, however, that the New York program does not, on
its face, pose a sufficiently grievous threat to either interest to establish a
constitutional violation.
97
In its ruling, the Court ultimately upheld the New York program
since the possibilities of public disclosure were minimal. The Court
did acknowledge that "the right to privacy might be recognized in the
future to include the right to control [personal] information. '" 9 Near
92 316 U.S. 535, 541, 543 (1942).
93 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-84 (1965).
94 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Here the Court reaffirmed that the "right of privacy" is
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty. Id. at 152-53.
95 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
96 Id. at 591.
9' Id. at 599-600 (emphases added) (citations omitted).
98 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 84, at 826. See generally Heyward C. Hosch III, Note, The Interest
in Limiting Disclosure of Personal Information: A Constitutional Analysis, 36 VAND. L. REV. 139
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the end of his majority opinion, Justice Stevens wrote, "We are not
unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast
amounts of personal information .... [M]uch of [the information] is
personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if dis-
closed."99
With such language, the Curry situation fits perfectly into the Su-
preme Court's rubric. In fact, Curry's case is a logical extension of
the Court's reasoning: protection of DNA information involves
"avoiding disclosure of personal matters," and, particularly because
this is an employment matter, Curry's ability to retain "independence
in... important decisions" is the heart of the issue.
While the Whalen Court found that mere collection of information
was not enough of a risk of maltreatment to violate the Constitution,
the Curry case is different because it extends into the realm of em-
ployment protections-the Bulls made an employment offer contin-
gent on the collection of information. This is precisely the type of
maltreatment the Court said was lacking in Whalen.
Additionally, and most importantly, Whalen shows that the Court is
willing to extend the fundamental right to privacy into the realm of
personal information.
C. Washington, Cruzan, and the Right to Refuse Treatment
In the 1990 case Washington v. Harper, the Court held that prison-
ers "possess[] a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted
administration" of certain drugs.00 Similarly, that Term's Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health, while not clearly embracing
strict scrutiny, 10 did say that "for purposes of this case, we assume that
the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a





Although this Court-recognized right to refuse medical treatment
is not directly related to Curry's right to keep his genetic information
private, the right has two implications for Curry. First, Curry could
argue that not submitting to testing is tantamount to refusing treat-
ment; this argument is made particularly strong here because the
Bulls made it clear they would not sign Curry otherwise. Second, this
line of cases provides Curry with a potential constitutional safeguard
(1983) (setting forth constitutional arguments for the protection of individuals' liberty interests
through controlling information the government collects).
99 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
100 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990).
101 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 84, at 821.
102 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
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that may still allow him to play basketball even if he were to submit to
testing.
D. The Bowers Framework and the Test for Granting a New Right
There is no clear test by which an unenumerated right becomes a
fundamental liberty interest, and the Court continually struggles with
that notion each time it considers a new potential fundamental right.
On the one hand, recognizing a fundamental right may seem like the
just and consistent thing to do-particularly if privacy interests are
involved-but on the other hand, the Court would not want to open
up the floodgates and dilute the idea of a fundamental right to the
point where nearly every governmental law is examined under strict
scrutiny.
Justice White's opinion for the majority and Justice Blackmun's
dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick03 highlight the Court's analysis of the
differing sides of this issue, and provide a framework under which to
evaluate the Curry situation.
Bowers was a test case brought by Michael Hardwick, a private citi-
zen who was arrested under a Georgia antisodomy statute.10 4 Hard-
wick claimed that the Georgia statute violated his fundamental right
to privacy. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with Hardwick, citing the
right to privacy as established in Griswold and Roe, among others.
10 5
The Supreme Court, however, reversed in a 5-4 decision.106
In his majority opinion, Justice White defined fundamental rights in
a relatively fixed manner: he argued that earlier determinations of
fundamental rights were limited to family and reproduction, and be-
cause homosexual activity did not fall under these previously defined
categories, it could not be a fundamental right.1 °7 He further wrote
that an activity not protected by the Constitution's text, the Framers'
intent, or a tradition of being safeguarded could not be made into a
fundamental right."8
Justice Blackmun employed a more thematic approach to the is-
sue of determining fundamental rights. Rather than defining fun-
damental rights by looking at the mere facts of each case (such as de-
claring that one case is about "schooling" and that another case is
about "sodomy"), he claimed the analysis should be based on the val-
103 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
104 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 84, at 814.
105 Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1211 (1lth Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), over-
ruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
106 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186, 191, 196.
107 Id. at 191.
108 Id. at 194.
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ues that underlie the constitutional right to privacy. 0 9 For Blackmun,
Bowers was not about sodomy, but "about 'the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right
to be let alone."' 1'0 Under this view, therefore, an historical basis for
protection is not necessary. In fact, Blackmun quotes Justice Holmes,
writing "I believe that '[i] t is revolting to have no better reason for a
rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.""'1 "
Blackmun uses this framework to conclude that private consensual
sexual activity fits within the idea of privacy the Court has embraced
as a fundamental right, and that "[o]nly the most willful blindness"
could conclude otherwise." 2
This Comment argues that Justice Blackmun's contention is cor-
rect: there should be no previously defined set list of fundamental
rights based on history; rather, the values behind the fundamental
rights should be the basis for determining the existence of new rights.
Indeed, the Supreme Court may have implicitly endorsed Justice
Blackmun's contention when it overruled Bowers in its Lawrence deci-
sion.
113
Additionally, six years after Bowers, the Court majority in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey provided a newer and
more liberal view of the process by which an unenumerated right
generally gains constitutional protection under the Due Process
Clause. The language in Casey focuses on the importance of per-
sonal dignity and autonomy, and it summed up due process funda-
mental-right protection: "[M]atters[] involving the most intimate
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment." 15 DNA information can certainly be
construed in the same light.
19 Id. at 199.
"' Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
I Id. (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Address at the Dedication of the New Hall of the
Boston University School of Law: The Path of the Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
469 (1897)).
112 Id. at 205.
113 This endorsement depends on how one characterizes O'Connor's concurrence, which
classified the decision as one of equal protection. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). The majority found a freedom to engage in sodomy through an
approach from the broad set of values protected by Fourteenth Amendment liberty: "Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain
intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its
more transcendent dimensions." Id. at 562 (majority opinion).
114 505 U.S. 833, 914 (1992) (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115 Id. at 851 (majority opinion).
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Similar to the majority in Bowers, the Casey majority also men-
tioned the importance of historical protection of a right, saying that
due process is partly determined by "regard to what history teaches"
us about how we should treat that right. 16 While there is no lengthy
historical precedent for affording DNA information a heightened
status, Loving shows that the relatively recent protection of the right
by society can suffice.'1 7 Indeed, the Court in Casey underscored that
"[d]ue process has not been reduced to any formula."" 8 There is,
therefore, no constitutional bar on giving DNA information the status
of a fundamental right. Senator Diane Feinstein spoke in 2006 about
the importance of remaining flexible in adding fundamental protec-
tions under the Fourteenth Amendment: "If an originalist analysis
were applied to the 14th amendment, women would not be provided
equal protection under the Constitution, interracial marriages could
be outlawed, schools could still be segregted, and the principle of
one man, one vote would not govern ....
Under such a framework, granting the fundamental right of pri-
vacy to Curry is an easy decision. DNA information concerns an indi-
vidual's private medical information, and the Court has already rec-
ognized in Whalen that such a consideration is in line with the Court's
conception of what due process privacy should be. Indeed, this case
is about Curry's ability to control his body and not be tested; this is
similar to the right to control one's body framed in Griswold and Roe,
and even the right to refuse medical treatment put forth in Washing-
ton and Cruzan. Ultimately, the Court's jurisprudence should make it
simple to reach a finding that DNA information is protected; to find
otherwise would entail departing from the Court's many precedents of
providing protections for individuals' right to control their bodies.
Erwin Chemerinsky amalgamates past Supreme Court decisions to
provide a three-step analysis for completing the analysis of a law's le-
gitimacy once a right is deemed to be fundamental. 20 He argues that,
after determining the existence of a fundamental right, the Court will
then ask if there is an infringement of the right, if there is a sufficient
justification for the government's infringement, and if the means is
16 Id. at 850 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1960) (plurality opinion) (Harlan,
J., dissenting)).
17 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (protecting interracial marriage, even though
the country did not have a long history of doing so).
118 505 U.S. at 849 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1960) (plurality opinion)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
19 Press Release, Sen. Diane Feinstein, Senator Diane Feinstein Details Her Reasons for Op-
posing Judge Samuel Alito to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (Jan. 26, 2006),
available at http://feinstein.senate.gov/06releases/r-alito-floorl26.pdf.
120 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 84, at 764.
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sufficiently related to the purpose. Regardless of whether there
would be compelling governmental interest in the Bulls' case, Curry
deserved to have his right to his genetic information analyzed as a
fundamental right under the liberty component of the Due Process
Clause.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION
[N]or shall any State... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
-Equal Protection Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution
1 2
In addition to a due process claim, Curry also has an equal protec-
tion claim. Indeed, due process and equal protection analyses often
overlap. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
focuses on the justification of a law's classification of individuals.
123
Unlike due process, where Curry had a privacy right over the infor-
mation itself, equal protection gives Curry the right to prevent the
government from discriminating against him based on his genetic in-
formation. In addition, in order to give substance to such an equal
protection right, equal protection must also give Curry a right to de-
cline DNA testing in the first place.
The Equal Protection Clause was largely ignored by the Court un-
til Korematsu v. United States'24 in 1944 and Brown v. Board of Education12 5
in 1954, which then ushered in the "modern era of equal protection
jurisprudence.' 26  Since then, the Court has frequently used the
Equal Protection Clause to combat invidious discrimination. 27 Equal
protection jurisprudence over the years has evolved a three-part
analysis, 28 and the Curry situation concerning privacy of DNA infor-
mation meets each of the three steps.
A. Question One: What Is the Classification?
This question asks how the government distinguishes among peo-
ple. The answer here is not that the government would be distin-
guishing among people based on their DNA analysis. For the pur-
121 Id. at 766-68.
122 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
123 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 84, at 643.
124 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
125 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
126 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 84, at 642.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 644-47. While the Court has not clearly defined equal protection with such a test,
this model, like many of the possible models, incorporates the Court's analysis from its equal
protection cases. Id. at 643.
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poses of the Comment, the answer is that government would be dis-
tinguishing among people based on their willingness to provide DNA
information. ' The issue is privacy.
B. Question Two: What Is the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny?
It is in addressing this question that the Court has provided a vari-
ety of levels of scrutiny to apply to government classifications, and it is
here where analysis will reveal that DNA information should be given
heightened scrutiny.
The lowest and most general level of scrutiny the Court has ap-
plied has been rational-basis review.13  Here, the Court allows great
legislative discretion in classifying individuals in order to meet the
legislative purpose. For example, the Court declared in United States
Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz that with regard to "line-drawing" in
legislative classifications, "[w]here, as here, there are plausible rea-
sons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at an end.' 3' Under this test,
the classification must simply be "rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose,"'132 and "the fact the line might have been
drawn differently at some points is a matter for legislative, rather than
judicial, consideration.',
13
On the other extreme, the Court has identified race as the quin-
tessential example of a classification that should receive strict scru-
tiny. Based on a confluence of American history and the fundamen-
tal idea that race should not be a basis for determining classifications,
the governmental action is given "the most rigid scrutiny"134: the gov-
ernment needs the strongest possible rationale to justify a race-based
classification. 3 5 The Court has determined that laws under this classi-
fication should be subjected to a two-part test: "they must be justified
1 This is the same issue that made potential ADA protections moot. See discussion supra
Part II.A. 1.
130 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 84, at 645.
131 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (writing about the fairness of making distinctions among em-
ployees in a railroad retirement provision).
132 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 84, at 646. The Court has also considered cases where there is
"rational basis with bite," Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny
by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 779 (1987), wherein the burden shifted from the plaintiff to
the state. In these cases, the Court was more suspicious of the rationale for the government's
classification. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996) (homosexuality); City of Cle-
burne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (mental disabilities); U.S. Dep't of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (communal living).
133 Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179.
13 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Ironically and ignominiously, al-
though Korematsu was the first case in which the Court gave race heightened protection, the
Court still managed to find that the government met its burden to intern all Japanese-
Americans. Id. at 224.
l33 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 84, at 645.
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUFTIONAL LAW
by a compelling governmental interest and must be 'necessary... to
the accomplishment' of their legitimate purpose. 0336
The Court has also found that a variety of classifications qualify
under "intermediate" or "heightened" scrutiny, where, unlike under
rational-basis review, the government has the burden of proof to jus-
tify its classifications. 13 7 The Court has given heightened protections
here to laws that discriminate by gender 3 8 as well as to laws that dis-
criminate against children born from nonmarital families. 13 9 More
recently, the Court has given a higher level of scrutiny to laws that
discriminate against gays and lesbians.
14
0
While there has yet to be one clear test for determining whether a
classification should get heightened scrutiny, a commonality among
heightened classifications is that the characteristic upon which the
classification is based is something that individuals have not "earned"
but which has been given to them or placed upon by them by circum-
stances wholly outside of their control. In other words, classifications
have received heightened scrutiny because they are like race in this
regard. The focus on something an individual cannot change has
been one constant throughout the heightened equal protection cases
from Korematsu all the way through Lawrence--and this is exactly the
situation with DNA information.
A strong case can be made for heightened protection when the
government distinguishes among people based on their DNA infor-
mation. One's DNA information is an immutable characteristic, like
race, and laws that discriminate on the basis of an immutable charac-
teristic should be given heightened scrutiny. If the Court is to be
consistent with its goal of allowing people to compete on an individ-
ual basis, then DNA information must receive heightened protection
from government policies that attempt to take advantage of knowl-
edge of genetic information.
The classification explored for the purposes of the Curry situa-
tion, however, is discrimination based on the willingness to provide
DNA information. Willingness to provide is not an immutable char-
136 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 196 (1964)).
137 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 84, at 645.
138 See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (using a stronger test than rational-basis
review to scrutinize an Idaho law that gave preference to males in intestate cases).
139 See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988) (overturning a state law that required
nonmarital children to establish paternity by the age of six in order to receive child support);
Levy v. Louisiana ex rel. Charity Hosp. of La. at New Orleans Bd. of Adm'rs, 391 U.S. 68, 72
(1968) (finding unconstitutional a state law that barred nonmarital children from suing under
a wrongful death statute).
140 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (invalidating a Texas antisodomy
law); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996) (striking down legislation directed at
homosexuals as class-based).
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acteristic like the content of one's DNA, but for the right of privacy of
DNA information to have substance, it must include the right to re-
fuse a DNA test.
There are several explanations for this conclusion. First, if the
Courts were to give strict scrutiny to discrimination based on DNA in-
formation, they could only be applying strict scrutiny to government
actions-such as mandatory testing-that access that information.
Second, we can ask, why would the government test for DNA infor-
mation without intending to use the DNA information? Once taking
action based on DNA content is barred, there is a tremendously chal-
lenging enforcement problem in preventing the government from
using the information it has obtained. But since the government
probably would not have tested if it could not use the information, we
can circumvent the enforcement problem and instead disallow the
government from getting its hands on the genetic information to be-
gin with.
Certainly, there may be a government interest in having DNA in-
formation that overcomes strict scrutiny, such as collecting informa-
tion in the aggregate in a way that does not identify individuals with
their DNA. This would be like the government collecting informa-
tion on another immutable characteristic, race, in its census figures.
The government asks for racial information, but it does not ask for
names, and does not keep track of what individual is of what race.
This, however, was not the situation Curry faced. The collection
of his DNA information was not for anonymous, aggregative pur-
poses, but instead to find out information about him specifically. In
order to have control over his DNA information, Curry needed to
have control over whether or not he could consent to DNA testing.
Because he did not have such a right, Curry was faced with a
Hobson's choice-by refusing testing, he was out of a job, regardless
of what his DNA information said. If he had accepted testing, he
would have sacrificed control over his DNA content and potentially
lost his job because of it. Either way he chose, he would have lost.
As a policy matter, we do not want employers to be able to put
their employees in this position. The key factor in Curry's case was
not the DNA information but the willingness to provide it. For the
right to not be discriminated against based on one's DNA content to
have any meaning at all, one needs to have the affirmative right to
not consent to government-imposed testing.
There is inevitably a concern that recognizing an additional right
will open the door of heightened protection to undeserving rights.
This was precisely the concern when an individual's right to private,
consensual sodomy was affirmed by the Court in Lawrence, the three
members of the dissent were concerned about a slippery slope toward
other outlawed forms of sexual behavior: "[s] tate laws against big-
amy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation,
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adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable
only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based on moral choices.... l
However, the Court has now granted heightened scrutiny numerous
times over the last sixty years. Each time it has done so it has been
very specific and narrow about the right it is granting. There is no
reason to believe that it would not choose its words carefully here. As
Brett McDonnell has observed, "the fact that the Court has now gone
partway down a slippery slope does not mean that it is irrevocably
committed to going further. 1 42 Moreover, though there may be the
potential for a slippery slope, the risk of that potential becoming real-
ity is small compared with the benefits from giving protection over an
individual's genetic makeup.
C. Question Three: Does Government Action Meet the Level of Scrutiny?
Under this final step of the analysis, the legality of an action de-
pends both upon the nature of the government action and on
whether the action is sufficiently targeted to the purpose it claims.
143
In Curry's case, if the Bulls were the government, they would claim
the health of the player outweighs any privacy interests Curry has. A
court would examine the facts to determine the extent of the danger
to Curry's health. From Curry's side, if DNA information had
heightened protection, his right to privacy would weigh particularly
heavily-heavier than the prisoner's and the servicemen's rights to




In addition, due to heightened scrutiny, the Court should be
more suspicious of a governmental assertion regarding health and
should carefully examine such claims to determine their veracity; this
is unlike the great latitude courts give the government in a non-
heightened rational-basis review. Here, the fact that several promi-
nent cardiologists cleared Curry to play would weigh heavily against
the government. 46 Ultimately, with constitutional weight behind his
right to genetic privacy, Curry would have a strong case. Regardless
of the outcome, Curry deserves the most protection possible.
141 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142 Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S LJ. 337, 338 (2004).
143 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 84, at 647 (expounding on the distinction between overin-
clusive and underinclusive laws in achieving their ends).
144 See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 834 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[C]onditional releasees
enjoy severely constricted expectations of privacy relative to the general citizenry ....").
145 See Mayfield v. Dalton, 109 F.3d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1997) (identifying the diminished
privacy expectations of soldiers in the United States military).
146 See supra note 9.
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While the Bulls situation is still not a slam-dunk case for Curry,
there will certainly be other situations where, even under heightened
scrutiny, government interventions into genetic information (and
subsequent discrimination based on the information gathered) will
hold up.' 7 As with the exceptions in due process, such analysis is out-
side the scope of this Comment.
IV. THE STATUTORY ALTERNATIVE
[T]hree in four Americans (76 percent) say Congress should pass a law
specifically to protect a person's genetic information from being used to
discriminate against them.
-Research!America, September 2006148
There could be alternative means for Curry to stay on the Bulls
without submitting to testing. In addition to a potential Fourth
Amendment argument, 49 Curry could also gain protection under a
statutory solution.
The federal government could merely codify into legislation what
already should be a fundamental right. While no such legislation is
currently proposed, its goal could entail two simple parts: (1) to pro-
tect individuals from employment discrimination based on their will-
ingness to submit to DNA testing; and (2) to stop employers from us-
ing any obtained DNA information in a discriminatory fashion. The
advantage of a statutory solution is that it would make the law clear
now, instead of prolonging the resolution of this debate through the
wait for ideal test cases to go up to and be decided by the Supreme
Court. In addition, it would avoid the political claims of illegitimacy
of judicial legislating that may arise if the Court were to find a new
right.
Indeed, such a policy orientation is not farfetched; in fact, it
would be in line with current administration policy. Reacting to a
ruling by the Fourth Circuit on HIPAA's privacy rule, a Bush official
declared, "This administration strongly supports a policy of providing
147 For example, the federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42
U.S.C. § 14132 (2000), as amended byJustice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, §§ 203,
302, 118 Stat. 2260, 2269-70, 2272 (2004) and Violence Against Women and Department of
Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 1002, 119 Stat. 2960, 3084 (2006),
which establishes a national DNA database for criminals, would likely be found constitutional
upon a demonstration that the database helps law enforcement catch violent criminals across
the nation. See also supra note 131 (discussing a justification for governmental discriminatory
action based on race, the recipient of the highest tier of scrutiny).
148 Press Release, Research!America, Americans Willing to Donate Genetic Material for Re-
search: Federal Law Needed to Protect Genetic Privacy (Sept. 19, 2006), available at
http://www.researchamerica.org/media/releases/9.19.06.personalizedmed.html.
149 See supra Part I.B (discussing courts' interpretations of search and seizure with respect to
genetic information).
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a first-time-ever federal level of protection for the medical records of
all Americans." 50
In addition to the medical component, the law could also be sold
as a simple consolidation and clarification of the type of employment
and privacy protections that businesses are already utilizing and that
the American people already want.15 1 States could still retain flexibil-
ity to have more strict DNA protections if they choose.
V. CONCLUSION
[T]he era of genomic testing may have already begun. According to a
recent report, at least one rugby team down under is already testing play-
ers for ACTN3 and 10 other sports-related genes to help players optimize
their workouts. For example, athletes with "power" genotypes might be
given additional weight training, while those with "endurance" genotypes
might be asked to run longer distances. The team's physiologist predicts
such screening will soon become routine for sports teams.
-Duke Institute for Genome Sciences and Policy, 2006152
There is no question that something needs to be done about the
state of genetic privacy. There are no clear statutory or judicial doc-
trines, and, dangerously, private industry is beginning to take the
matter into its own hands.'
The potential for the subsequent abuse of DNA information that
has come into the employer's hands is real. Anita Silvers and Michael
Ashley Stein suggest that, "[f1or example, individuals who provide
DNA to be tested for susceptibility to heart disease could, years later,
find that they have been dismissed. . . because of new data that the
gene has some expression for an early onset of Alzheimer's dis-
ease."15 4  Indeed, the fears are legitimate "that employers will use
150 Press Release, Tommy G. Thompson, Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., Regarding the
Ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit Regarding Constitutional Challenge to
the Privacy Rule (Apr. 14, 2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2003pres/
20030429a.html.
151 See Lohr, supra note 78 (identifying IBM as a primary force in bringing this issue to state
and federal attention).
152 OfJocks and Genes, GENOMELIFE (Duke Inst. for Genome Scis. and Policy, Durham, N.C.),
May/June 2006, at 1, 3.
153 In addition to the range of (and lack of) protections offered by private companies, the
NBA itself, in response to the Curry incident, has introduced mandatory cardiac testing. While
stopping short of requiring DNA testing, the tests give the NBA much more information about
a player's health. See Howard Beck, The N.B.A. Is the First League to Begin Standardized Cardiac
Screening, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2006, SportsSunday, at 5. One of the architects of the new
league policy is Dr. Barry Maron-the same doctor who urged the Bulls to have Curry tested.
Id.
154 Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Human Rights and Genetic Discrimination: Protecting
Genomics'Promise for Public Health, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 377, 378 (2003).
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these data to discriminate against currently healthy applicants with
'time-bomb' genetic profiles.",115
The dissent in Kincade warned us about the potential for a slippery
slope without high barriers to obtaining DNA information, noting
that if weight is not given to the privacy right for DNA information,
governmental justifications would always outweigh in a balancing test:
"it is difficult to imagine that the balancing of interests... would not
justify the[gathering of] data regarding allAmericans .... ,,56  The
time to act is now, as employers are increasingly embracing the need
for testing, focusing on job performance and health-care costs. 5'
There is no question that American society acknowledges the
need for protection of DNA information. As Victor Schachter has
noted, "[g] enetic testing has replaced HIV testing as the current hot-butto . . ..158
button health testing issue. The Executive, Congress, state legisla-
tures, the courts at various levels, and even private industry have all
acknowledged the need for some protection of workers' genetic
rights, yet there is still no comprehensive protection.
The framework for providing a constitutional protection over
DNA information is already there; providing such protection would
be not a departure from but a mere continuation of the Court's
evolving Fourteenth Amendmentjurisprudence.
In Eddy Curry's situation, the Bulls should not have been able to
try to force him into submitting personal genetic information. The
right to privacy over DNA information is too important to be treated
in the scattered manner it is now. Ultimately, Alan Milstein, Curry's
attorney, is right: "[i]f the NBA were to get away with it, what about
everyone else in this country looking for ajob[?]" 
1 9
155 Schachter, supra note 24, at 192. At least one federaljudge agrees:
[iln our age in which databases can be "mined" in a millisecond ... and in which this
data can easily be stored and shared by governments and private parties worldwide, the
threat of a loss of privacy is real, even if we cannot yet discern the full scope of the prob-
lem.
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 842 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., concurring).
16 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 844 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
157 See Lohr, supra note 78 ("'The time is right,' explained Harriet Pearson, I.B.M.'s chief pri-
vacy officer. 'The market and medical practice is moving in this direction-to gather and use
genetic information.'"); see also supra Part I.C (discussing the reasons for greater genetic testing
by companies in the future).
158 Schachter, supra note 24, at 191.
159 Bulls, Curry, Lawyers Tussle over DNA Testing, supra note 1.
